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Abstract 
 
This thesis assesses the necessity of the Leninist vanguard party in leading revolutionary 
struggle. Three Maoist rebel groups, Peru’s Shining Path, Nepal’s Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) and India’s Communist Party of India (Maoist), all claiming to adhere to a 
centralized political power structure, will be analyzed in terms of their “success” in 
recruiting women into the party and in capturing territory.  Although all three movements 
appear to follow a similar vanguard party model, the leadership structures of the first two 
groups, the Shining Path and the CPN (M), have a centralized leadership, with a central 
committee lead by one or two major figures, deciding policy and promoting action.  The 
latter group, the CPI (M), appears to deviate from this model, as regional leaders seem to 
have a great degree of power and influence within the party. It is initially proposed that a 
centralized, or vanguard party structure would be more efficacious in bringing women into 
the movement as well as carrying out highly coordinated military campaigns in order to 
gain territory for the creation of base areas.  However, it is concluded that in the ongoing 
war with the Indian state, the CPI (M) has been able to achieve levels of success similar to 
the two former groups with a far less centralized party apparatus in place. 
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                                                         Introduction 
This struggle must be organized, according to “all the rules of 
the art”, by people who are professionally engaged in 
revolutionary activity. The fact that the masses are 
spontaneously being drawn into the movement does not make 
the organisation of this struggle less necessary. On the 
contrary, it makes it more necessary.1                                       
–V.I. Lenin 
Our vanguard revolutionaries must idealize their love for the 
people, for the most hallowed causes, and make it one and 
indivisible ... revolutionary leaders must have a large dose of 
humanity, a large dose of a sense of justice and truth to avoid 
falling into dogmatic extremes, into cold scholasticism, into 
isolation from the masses.2                                                                                            
-Ernesto “Che” Guevara 
 
 On October 26th, 1917, the former Tsar’s Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, Russia, 
was captured by Red Guard forces under the leadership of Bolshevik commanders, 
successfully ending the brief period of rule by the largely ineffectual Provincial 
Government and ushering in the creation of the world’s first socialist state.  Almost 32 
years later, after the cessation of the Chinese Civil War, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the 
People’s Republic of China.  These two examples differ in that the Chinese were 
embroiled in a civil war which lasted over 20 years before achieving state power, 
however, both the Bolsheviks and the Chinese communists were lead by centralized, or 
vanguard, parties, a concept developed by the brilliant intellectual and revolutionary, V.I. 
Lenin.  Many subsequent revolutions, successful and otherwise, were guided by a 
vanguard party, including the Vietnamese (under Ho Chi Minh) and the Cambodian 
revolutions (lead, most prominently, by Pol Pot).  Some Marxist theorists like Rosa 
Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek and Paul Mattick have argued that this sort of political 
                                                 
1
 Lenin, V.I. “The Primitiveness of the Economists and the Organization of the Revolutionaries.” Essential 
Works of Lenin.  
2
 Guevara, Ernesto. “Man and Socialism in Cuba.” 
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apparatus is not necessary for bringing about revolution, or is, in fact, authoritarian and 
anti-Marxist.3 4  The Cuban revolution of 1959 became the first socialist revolution to 
succeed without a Leninist party in the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle.5  
However, in the case of the several “Marxist” or “Maoist” insurrections and guerilla wars 
still being waged in Latin America and several parts of Asia, in particular, the vanguard 
party has been promoted by all and successfully implemented by most.  For a vanguard 
party, and a revolution in general, to be successful, a strong leader or leadership core 
must be present, and ideally, there must be a high level of coordination between the 
central committee and the regional bodies/leaders in order to successfully understand the 
desires of the masses and lead their struggle.   This is important, since, as Lenin wrote, 
“Every new form of struggle which brings new perils and sacrifices inevitably 
“disorganizes” an organization ill-prepared for the new form of struggle.”6  Centralized 
leadership is characterized as leadership based upon, or concentrated in one individual or 
several people who preside over a central committee or politburo which practices 
democratic centralism.  Practical decisions, discussed and agreed upon by the central 
committee, become binding on all members of the party, from the highest officials to the 
members of the army.  Without these characteristics, Stalin felt that, “the Party cannot be 
a single organized whole capable of exercising systematic and organized leadership in the 
struggle of the working class.”7 
                                                 
3
 Mattick, Paul. “Introduction to Anti-Bolshevik Communism.”  
4
 Luxemburg, Rosa. The Russian Revolution. See also Pannekoek, Anton. Lenin As Philosopher. Marquette 
University Press, 2003. 
5
 LeoGrande, William M. “Party Development in Revolutionary Cuba.” 458. 
6
 Lenin, V.I., quoted in György Lukács. “Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought.” 
7
 Stalin, J. V. Foundations of Leninism. 113. 
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 Here it will be necessary to make some distinctions between Leninism, Maoism, 
and to a lesser extent, Stalinism. In one of Lenin’s better known works, What is to be 
Done?, he outlined in rigorous detail the blueprints of for the vanguard party. The party’s 
main task would be to assume the role of leading all exploited classes in the democratic 
revolution, and the party would be “professional” in two ways: revolutionaries would 
devote themselves completely to party work and would be fully trained.  In 1935, when 
Mao and the remnants of the Chinese Communist Party arrived in Yan’an, the location 
became conducive for the socially transformative practices of and ideological rationale 
for Marxist revolution in China to be “articulated, implemented, and honed.”8  It was here 
that Mao, while residing in a cave, deepened his knowledge of Marxist dialectics and 
historical materialism while voraciously studying the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and 
Stalin. The latter, for Mao, seemed to possess a mechanical interpretation of the 
relationship between history and ideology and appeared to have a callous stance towards 
the peasantry and their revolutionary potential (it is interesting that Trotsky shared a 
similar view).9 Mao Tse-tung Thought rejects some of the more rigid aspects of Stalin 
and Lenin’s political philosophies and had a foundation firmly entrenched within Chinese 
history. The dialectics in Mao’s thought stem from his belief that dialectical materialism 
“emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth 
of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feelings but by the objective 
result in social practice.”10  For Mao, knowledge stemmed from practice, and because the 
peasantry was the largest demographic in China, their knowledge could be utilized for 
revolutionary purposes.  Lenin and Mao were quite similar in that they both advocated 
                                                 
8
 Karl, Rebecca E. Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History. 51. 
9
 McLellan, David. Marxism After Marx. 203. 
10
 Mao Tse-tung. “On Practice”. Selected Works, Vol. I. 297. 
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for the alliance of peasantry and proletariat as a requisite for a successful revolution, 
although Lenin placed a much greater emphasis on the role of the proletariat.11 In both 
Russia and China, the revolution was led by “professional revolutionaries,” yet in Russia 
it was the urban workers rather than the peasantry that lent decisive support to the 
Bolsheviks revolutionary aims.  One of Mao’s other major theoretical contributions was 
the idea of the “mass line” which was meant to combat political stagnation within the 
party and counter government bureaucracy, a feature prominent in Stalin’s Soviet Union.  
The slogan became, “To the masses, from the masses, to the masses”12, and the mass line 
became a new method of leadership in which the cadre were expected to learn from the 
peasants. Cadre within the Chinese Communist Party were supposed to thoroughly 
investigate the conditions of the peasants, thus allowing the party to learn about and 
subsequently participate in peasant struggles.  Instead of creating policy that was 
divorced from the masses, party cadre would gather ideas from them, leading to the 
creation of a strategy or plan of action based on the specific ideas and concerns of the 
masses which originated from concrete conditions.  However, the “mass line” was not a 
technique necessarily employed within the context of waging “People’s War”, and 
further, in theory, it suggests a certain level of decentralization of authority. However, in 
China, without widespread peasant support, it would have been unlikely that the Chinese 
Communist Party could have defeated the Japanese and Nationalist forces and eventually 
seized power.  Because Peru, Nepal and India contain vast populations of rural, semi-
literate or illiterate peasants living in a state of abjection, the political thought of Mao 
                                                 
11
 For a deeper analysis on the distinct differences and nuances between the political thought of Mao, Lenin 
and Stalin, see Schram, Stuart R. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1977. 
12
 Karl, Rebecca E. Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History. 59.  
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Tse-tung was especially charming to up-and-coming revolutionaries and radical 
intellectuals in each of those countries.  Each of the groups analyzed within this thesis 
self-identify themselves as “Maoist”; while they may not necessarily know the subtle 
differences between Leninism and Maoism, that fact is not particularly important to this 
study. 
The focus of this thesis is on three revolutionary groups that adhered to the 
political philosophy espoused by Mao Tse-tung: the Communist Party of Peru-Sendero 
Luminoso (referred to also as “The Shining Path”), the Unified Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist), and the Communist Party of India (Maoist).  Although all three 
movements appear to follow a similar vanguard party model, the leadership structures of 
the first two groups, the Shining Path and the CPN (M), have a centralized leadership, 
with a central committee lead by one or two major figures, deciding policy and 
promoting action.  The latter group, the CPI (M), appears to deviate from this model, as 
regional leaders seem to have a great degree of power and influence within the party.13  
Each group carried out their respective revolutionary wars for a different length of time, 
meaning that an arbitrary period of time, for example, 20 years, cannot be used as a frame 
of reference in analyzing each of the three groups.  The Shining Path did exist prior to 
1980, however, it had a limited presence in the rural areas and subsisted mainly within 
college campuses in Ayacucho, Huancayo, and Lima.14 Therefore, it will be examined 
from 1980, the year of its first “act of war”, until 1992, when its main leader was 
arrested, causing the movement to rapidly deteriorate.  Likewise, the CPN (M) existed 
prior to its launching of a people’s war in 1996, but it existed as a faction of another 
                                                 
13
 Ranjan Kamath, interviewed by the author.  
14
 Palmer, David Scott, ed. Shining Path of Peru. 20. 
 7 
 
party, and did not begin meaningful work in the countryside until 1995.15 For this thesis, 
the CPN (M) will be analyzed from beginning of the “Nepalese People’s War” in 1996 
until their agreement to lay down arms and participate in the electoral process in 2006.  
The CPI (M) is an amalgamation of nearly forty years of revolutionary activity and 
countless factions which emerged after the failed Naxalbari rebellion of 1967.  However, 
the CPI (M) and its actions will be appraised starting from 2004 with the merger of two 
of the largest Maoist factions to form today’s party and continuing to the present day. 
The three movements will be analyzed based upon their “success” which is 
defined as the completion of certain stated aims and goals of the party.  Initially, this may 
seem problematic, as few revolutionary groups actually accomplish their overall goals.  
Kishenji, a prominent Indian Maoist leader, when asked about what the goals of the 
movement were, responded, “Political power…without political power we cannot 
achieve anything.”16 Similarly, Manwaring, in discussing the Shining Path’s leader 
Abimael Guzmán, writes, “He further identified the primary objective of the insurgency 
as power. Power is generated by an intelligent, well-motivated, and highly disciplined 
organization with a vision and purposeful long-term program for gaining control of a 
state or a society.”17 However, it is not necessarily critical to measure how successful a 
revolutionary group is by its ability to seize power, especially since neither the Shining 
Path nor the CPN (M) captured power following a successful people’s war in the same 
manner as China or Cambodia.  Yet, the percentage of the country in which the group 
was able to operate in or control at its peak can be looked at and can be used to determine 
the success of the movements, in comparison to one another.  Besides the overall seizure 
                                                 
15
 Onesto, Li. Dispatches form the People’s War in Nepal. 7. 
16
 Mittal, Tusha. “I am the Real Desh Bhakt.” 
17
 Manwaring, Max G. “Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons.” 158. 
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of state power, Mao Tse-tung believed revolutions could be successful in smaller, yet 
equally meaningful ways, and wrote, “Wherever our comrades go, they must build good 
relations with the masses, be concerned for them and help them overcome their 
difficulties. We must unite with the masses; the more of the masses we unite with, the 
better.”18 In order to build good, enduring relationships with the masses, it was necessary 
for the guerillas to address and combat the issues that were most relevant to the rural 
populations, with gender inequality being a primary concern.   
For the duration of this thesis, success will be measured by the percentage of 
women within the party as well as the percentage of the country infiltrated or controlled 
by the rebel group.  As Lenin stated, “The experience of all liberation movements has 
shown that the success of a revolution depends on how much the women take part in it,” 
and talking about his own experience in establishing the Soviet Union, he said, “No other 
republic has so far been able to emancipate woman.”19  The question becomes, “Will a 
movement with a centralized party contain a larger percentage of women?”  In much of 
the developing world, women hold disproportionate amounts of influence within the 
political spectrum, yet if a centralized leadership expresses the desire to liquidate gender 
inequality, such as Lenin and the Bolsheviks did in the period prior to the October 
Revolution, women’s issues will be afforded a fair amount of attention and action.  
Therefore, if a centralized party exists, it should witness a larger percentage of its 
membership consisting of women in comparison to non-centralized parties operating in 
the same areas.  Woman may also be drawn to the party because of its promises of radical 
“social justice”, especially in combating domestic abuse and sexual violence, as well as 
                                                 
18
 Mao Tse-tung. “On the Chunking Negotiations.” Selected Works, Vol. IV. 59. 
19
 Lenin, V.I. “Speech at the First All-Russia Congress of Working Women.” Lenin’s Collected Works. 
181. 
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the opportunity to have a meaningful position.   The next question to be examined is, 
“Will a centralized party be able to, through military actions, be able to control a larger 
percentage of a country?”  If a party is centralized, meaning that the top of the hierarchy 
also controls the military, it should be able to carry out a highly coordinated military 
campaign in order to control territory and create base areas.  Disunity in military strategy 
and implementation should theoretically not exist, since there is only one line that is to be 
followed, passed down from the leaders in the party hierarchy.  In the case of a non-
centralized party, military decisions may differ between the various leaders, some of 
whom may be content in controlling the territory already under their influence while 
others seek to expand into new areas.20   
Success in combating issues like inequality will be reflected in a mechanism (i.e., 
the percentage of women within the party) which indicates coordination, since a 
centralized party espousing egalitarian principles should conceivably make a concerted, 
coordinated effort to actually implement its strategies.  If women are being recruited or 
are joining the party at a substantial rate, this would suggest coordination between the 
areas of recruitment (particularly in the rural base areas) and the leadership of the party.  
The role of women within the three movements will be discussed first.  After briefly 
discussing recruitment methods and the appeal of the party to women, the percentage of 
women making up the party will be analyzed and compared with several prominent 
political parties in that country as well as the other two Maoist groups.  Since each of the 
groups has been explicit in its condemnation of the baneful treatment of women, both by 
the state and by men in rural society who carry out a historical, hierarchical role, they 
could be deemed successful if they attract large numbers of women and recruit them for 
                                                 
20
 Ranjan Kamath, interviewed by the author. 
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various positions within the party and guerilla army.  Thus, a successful party is one that 
recognizes the plight of women and goes beyond simply censuring inequality which 
strongly pervades rural societies.  As Lenin stated, “The rights and social measures we 
demand of bourgeois society for women are proof that we understand the position and 
interests of women and that we will take note of them under the proletarian 
dictatorship.”21 Yet, if women feel they are isolated or mistreated by the party, it could 
suggest a lack of unity between the base area and the leadership, and, more importantly, a 
lack of success in achieving stated goals.   
Success, within the scope of this paper, will also be measured by the amount of 
territory controlled by the particular rebel groups. A centralized party should, 
theoretically, be active in more regions of a country because of its superior ability to 
coordinate military efforts, based on a hierarchical chain of command in which the top 
expects obedience from the bottom.22 At the same time, the top party organizations are 
expected to make a conscientious and pertinacious effort in becoming familiar with the 
situation in the rural base areas and with the life of the masses in order to possess an 
objective basis for proper guidance.23  Armies from several base areas can join together 
in a harmonious effort to repel a government attack or establish a new base area along 
with a new authority structure.  In a non-centralized party, various leaders may not want 
to merge forces or may see it as beneficial to use their armies to protect the areas that are 
already under their jurisdiction.24   
                                                 
21
 Quoted in Zetkin, Clara. “An Interview on the Women Question.” My Recollections of Lenin. 
22
 Wood, Elisabeth Jean. “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When is Wartime Rape Rare?” 137. 
23
 Mao Tse-tung. “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party.” Selected Works, Vol. I. 109. 
24
 Ranjan Kamath, interviewed by the author. 
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After the role of women and the control of territory, in relation to the three 
parties, are discussed at length, conclusions will be drawn on the effectiveness of the 
centralized party and its ability to affect coordination as well as whether the decentralized 
form of authority being practiced in India can be successful (in terms of assuaging 
inequality, controlling and expanding its power base, etc) in waging revolution.  Based 
upon the findings, the Nepalese movement has been the most successful, followed by the 
Shining Path, while the Indian movement is uncertain since it has yet to reach its logical 
conclusion.  Until the Indian example can be discussed in more certain, concrete terms, 
with a specific focus on the dynamics of its party structure, Lukács’ statement, “The 
party, as the strictly centralized organization of the proletariat’s most conscious elements 
– and only as such – is conceived as an instrument of class struggle in a revolutionary 
period,”25 cannot yet be negated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Lukács, György. “Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought.” 
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A Biography of the Groups and Their Leaders 
 
Every act of rebellion expresses a nostalgia for innocence and 
an appeal to the essence of being.26                                                                             
-Albert Camus 
 
No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary 
movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory 
and a knowledge of history and has a profound grasp of the 
practical movement.27                                                                                                                             
–Mao Tse-tung 
 
The Communist Party of Peru-Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 
 
Peru, a country of roughly 29 million people, is a diverse mix of Amerindians, 
Europeans, Africans and Asians.  Throughout Peru’s history, the former group has tended 
to be the most severely oppressed, first by the Spanish conquerors, and later, in the form 
of underdevelopment and political marginalization, by the post-independence Peruvian 
regimes, despite it making up over 40% of the population.28  Between 1920 and 1960, 
Quechua, the language spoken by most of the indigenous people, was not officially 
recognized or taught in schools, leaving a large percentage of the rural population 
illiterate.  Education was sparse in areas like Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica, 
and in the whole of the country, a mere three percent of the population owned eighty 
percent of the arable land.29  Due to the lack of farmland, the indigenous people migrated 
to the cities and coast, only to find themselves culturally isolated and politically, as well 
as economically, powerless.30  The peasants who stayed in the rural areas hardly fared 
better, since Peru’s highland, in 1980, was a region as impecunious as some of the 
poorest countries in the world, and because of a severe paucity of physicians, life 
                                                 
26
 Camus, Albert. The Rebel. 
27
 Mao Tse-tung. “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War.” Selected Works, Vol. II. 
208. 
28
 Starn, Orin. “Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of 
History.” 401-402. 
29
 Eckstein, Susan, ed. Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements. 67. 
30
 Strong, Simon. Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru. 47. 
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expectancy rates were oftentimes as low as in sub-Saharan Africa.31 Revolutionary 
intellectuals, inspired by the successful Cuban revolution in 1959, began forming 
contacts with these disillusioned peasants, some of whom went on to stage rebellions, all 
of which ended in utter failure.32  It was this revolutionary climate from which the 
Shining Path was able to manifest, under the tutelage of a former professor of philosophy.  
Peru’s first major Marxist theorist was José Maria Mariateguí, the founder of the 
Communist Party of Peru. His writings, which stressed Peru’s fascist, semifeudal and 
semicolonial nature, became building blocks for the nascent Shining Path movement, and 
an early source of inspiration for the movement’s leader, Abimael Guzmán.33  However, 
it was to be Maoism that captivated and ultimately defined the movement.  Maoist 
thought had a strong grip on the Peruvian Communist intellectuals since the aftermath of 
the Chinese civil war in 1949, particularly since it emphasized a reliance on the 
peasantry, a group that Stalin was famously ambivalent towards, and thus was mentioned 
very little in the Soviet literature.34  Similarly to Mao, who encountered Marxist 
philosophy while a student at Beijing University, Guzmán was introduced, in the early 
1960s, to the ideology that would energize the Shining Path while working on his 
dissertations at the San Agustín National University in Arequipa.  As an intellectual, was 
also well skilled in the subtleties of Western culture, analogously to another famous rebel 
leader, Pol Pot.  Just as the latter was know for his veneration of French writers like 
Mallarmé and Rimbaud while a professor at a French lycee in Phnom Penh, Guzmán 
exhibited a particular fondness for Hegel and Heidegger, and wrote his doctoral thesis on 
                                                 
31
 Eckstein, Susan, ed. Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements. 67. 
32
 Strong, Simon. Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru. 16-18. 
33
 Rosenau, William. “Is the Shining Path the ‘New Khmer Rouge’?” 311. 
34
 Strong, Simon. Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru. 71. 
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Kant’s theory of space.35  Encouraged by several of his more radical professors, Guzmán 
studied Quechua, the language spoken by Peru’s indigenous population, and later became 
increasingly active in left-wing political circles. He began to attract many like-minded 
young academics committed to bringing about revolution in Peru, and soon, he was able 
to exert his influence within the Communist Party of Peru.  After a trip to China during 
the height of the Cultural Revolution, which Guzmán viewed as “mankind’s most 
glorious achievement”, he began advocating a “scientific truth” based on the Marxist 
classics and a new synthesis of Peruvian economic and social factors, which resonated 
strongly with the newly educated youth, as well as countless teachers and professors in 
the southern highlands of Peru, although it was initially esoteric to Peru’s indigenous 
populations.36  
In the 1960s, after the split of the Peruvian Communist Party, Guzmán emerged 
as the leader of the pro-Chinese faction which became known as the Sendero Luminoso 
(named because of a quote in which Mariateguí termed Marxism–Leninism as “sendero 
luminoso al futuro”).37  In Peru, Guzmán became somewhat of an enigmatic and mystical 
figure, with the news media reporting stories on his death or supposed “sightings” 
without any hard evidence due to his “supernatural” ability to evade the authorities 
during both the years of Francisco Morales Bermúdez’s presidency as well as the height 
of the Shining Path campaign.38 Within the Party, however, he was the premier 
theoretical and tactical authority and his influence was ubiquitous. According to Poole 
and Rénique, “The high degree of discipline and centralism which unites its militants 
                                                 
35
 Žižek, Slavoj. “The Violence of Liberal Democracy.” 93. 
36
 Arnson, Cynthia J. and I. William Zartman, eds. Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of 
Need, Creed, and Greed. 57-59.  
37
 Rosenau, William. “Is the Shining Path the ‘New Khmer Rouge’?” 311. 
38
 Stavans, Ilan. “Two Peruvians.” 27. 
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around the armed struggle is directly related to the extraordinary personality cult which 
grew up around Guzmán. For Senderistas, every command and action has been an 
expression of the will of Guzmán, known to the party members as ‘Presidente 
Gonzalo’.”39  In order to fully illustrate Guzmán’s ascendancy over the Party and its 
proceedings, a pamphlet was published, entitled Bases for Discussion, which read: 
 
It is the obligation of all militants to struggle permanently to defend and 
preserve the Party leadership, especially the leadership of Chairman 
Gonzalo, our chief, against any attack from within or outside the party, and 
to subject ourselves to his leadership and personal command raising the 
slogans ‘Learn from Chairman Gonzalo’ and ‘Incarnate Gonzalo’s 
Thought’…who knows revolutionary theory, has knowledge of history, and 
a profound understanding of practice; who…has overthrown revisionism, 
right- and left-wing liquidationism, right-wing opportunism and right-
wingism; who has reconstituted the Party, leads in the people’s war and has 
become the greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, great political and 
military strategist, philosopher, master of communists, center of party 
unification.40 
 
In order to seize power in Peru, Guzmán adhered to, and fiercely promoted Mao’s idea 
of “people’s war” as well as a Sorel-inspired adulation of revolutionary violence. 
According to the French philosopher Georges Sorel, violence within the framework of a 
Marxist class war is necessary and heroic and should be viewed as in the service of the 
“immemorial interest of civilization.”41 In one of the few interviews ever granted by 
Guzmán, he stated, “…the need for revolutionary violence, is a universal law with no 
exception. Revolutionary violence is what allows us to resolve fundamental 
contradictions by means of an army, through people's war… Mariátegui said that only 
by destroying, demolishing the old order could a new social order be brought into being. 
In the final analysis, we judge these problems in light of the basic principle of war 
                                                 
39
 Poole, Deborah and Gerardo Rénique. Peru: Time of Fear. 44. 
40
 Quoted in Ibid., p. 44. 
41
 Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence. xvi. 
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established by Chairman Mao: the principle of annihilating the enemy’s forces and 
preserving one's own forces.”42  The use of violence, especially in retribution for 
misconduct against women or other criminal acts, as judged by a people’s court, seemed 
to have a particular attraction among the rural population. For instance, in Chuschi, a 
town controlled by the Shining Path within Ayacucho, the first enemies to be executed 
were cattle thieves from a neighboring village which also happened to be Chuschi’s 
traditional enemy.43 During the buildup phase, prior to the launching of the people’s 
war, Abimael Guzmán focused on doctrine and leadership development and on 
expanding his organization’s “relationships with relatively isolated peasant communities 
in the outlying districts in the highlands around the city of Ayacucho.”44  The 
preparatory activities to achieve Guzmán’s vision were to establish a dedicated cadre 
and a revolutionary party, a guerilla army, and a support mechanism for the entire 
organization, a process that was estimated to take 15 to 20 years.45  It was not until 
1980, however, that the Shining Path became fully know to the authorities, despite 
existing in the countryside for fifteen years prior.  During the period of 1980-1992, 
Guzmán was a giant, god-like figure within the movement, a movement which could not 
operate unless he allowed it to, and everyone within the party and the base areas 
contributed to the metastasization of his personality cult.  In discussing the structure of 
the party, Huston writes, “Sendero is organized into a many leveled body with a tightly 
controlled cellular structure which makes it easy for the few people at the top to control 
and virtually impossible to penetrate…The Sendero leadership is structured around a 
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national conference of constituent members.  All decisions are made by a Central 
Committee which comprises leaders from five strategic regions.”46  His capture, 
unceremoniously in a small apartment above a ballet studio in Lima in 1992, nearly 
brought the movement to a screeching halt, a phenomenon that may support arguments 
for decentralized leadership within social movements or rebel groups.  
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
In 1996, a people’s war broke out in the seemingly peaceful, mountainous 
republic of Nepal.  Under the leadership of the CPN (M), the armed struggle, modeled 
upon the Shining Path movement in Peru, flared up in the Mid-west and far-west 
regions of the country.  After witnessing bank robberies, attacks on police stations and 
army barracks, and the burning of loan papers to indebted farmers, King Birenda and the 
Parliamentary leadership of Nepal perhaps wished that they had taken the CPN (M)’s 
declaration of people’s war more seriously.47  Nepal has a similar history to countries 
like Thailand, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and even Iran in that it was never colonized and 
that it experienced, for much of its history, a monarchical, feudal style of rule.  This type 
of system was responsible for explosive socio-political tensions between the King and 
other rising elites as well as between the dominant and exploited classes, yet Nepal was 
the lone country to experience a classical peasant-based revolutionary upsurge which 
lead to the eventual overthrow of the monarchy.48  The CPN (M) was not immediately 
palpable, but was a product of the legacy of failed leftist movements which were always 
deeply ingratiated within the larger struggle of the peasantry.49  This movement differed 
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from its predecessors, however, due to its adherence to Maoism, an ideology that 
became increasingly important within Nepal during China’s Cultural Revolution.50   
The two major theorists within the party, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (better known by 
his nom de guerre, Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai, differed from many famous 
communist leaders in that they had poor or middle peasant backgrounds, meaning that 
the poverty and hunger experienced by the peasants was an intimate issue, even at a 
young age.  Yet the two men had very differing paths which eventually lead them to the 
creation of the CPN (M), and while Prachanda was employed by a rural development 
project and working within the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal) in 1986, Bhattarai 
was completing his doctoral thesis entitled The Nature of Underdevelopment and 
Regional Structure of Nepal, a Marxist analysis which viewed development as a process 
triggered by contradictions between the forces and relations of production.51  Despite the 
somewhat disparate approaches, both men were able to come to the conclusion that the 
rural population of Nepal was frustrated, in part, by “failed” or “incomplete” 
development, and in 1995, a year after they founded the CPN (M), they deduced that the 
conditions in Nepal, “were ripe for launching, building, and sustaining an armed 
struggle and that such a struggle could unite and mobilize Nepal’s peasantry.”52  The 
conditions they viewed as potential catalysts for a people’s war included a corrupt, 
semi-feudal state system with little influence outside several of the major cities, large 
populations of people in rural areas lacking any sort of infrastructure or health and 
education facilities, and endemic poverty.  Specifically, in 1996, the literacy rate in 
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Nepal was below 35 %, and over 68% of the population was living under $1 a day.53  
Before the launching of the people’s war in 1996, the incipient party embarked on a 
year-long campaign to build support among the peasants in Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot 
districts, and villagers were mobilized to challenge the existing local authority structures 
as well as construct bridges, roads, and latrines.54 The decision making of the party was 
handled by a standing committee of seven members (including Prachanda and 
Bhattarai).  Underneath the standing committee, the central committee contained forty to 
fifty members and oversaw five regional bureaus, each of which supervised three sub-
regions.55 
After the second conference of the CPN (M), Prachanda was elevated from 
general secretary to chairman, and the party adopted an ideology known as “Prachanda 
Path”. In discussing this policy shift, senior Maoist leader Mohan Vaidya (Kiran) stated, 
“Just as Marxism was born in Germany, Leninism in Russian and Maoism in China, 
Prachanda Path is Nepal’s identity of revolution. Just as Marxism has three facets- 
philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism, Prachanda Path is a 
combination of all three totally in Nepal’s political context.”56  Prachanda no doubt was 
taking a page out of Abimael Guzmán’s book, who stated, in a rare interview, “In sum, 
Gonzalo Thought is none other than the application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to 
our (Peru’s) concrete reality.”57  Prachanda may have been similar to the former leader 
of the Shining Path in that he reframed Maoism to fit Nepal’s “concrete reality” and 
declared himself “chairman” of the party, but differed from Guzmán in another major 
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aspect.  According to Gellner, “On the same day (February 13, 2006), marking the tenth 
anniversary of the start of the Maoist insurgency, the BBC broadcast an interview with 
Prachanda…it caused a sensation in Nepal because, until then, only two photos of the 
Maoist leader were ever seen, and he had been shrouded in mystery.”58  In this regard, 
Prachanda was more like Pol Pot, the somewhat recondite leader of the Khmer Rouge 
who also shied away from massive amounts of exposure and personality cults. For 
Prachanda, the comparison to Pol Pot did not end there, as the former United States 
Ambassador to Nepal, James Moriarty, began a media campaign to warn of the 
similarities between Nepal’s Maoists and Pol Pot’s movement in Cambodia.59 Despite 
military support for the monarchy coming from the United States, India, and China, the 
CPN (M) was able to operate to a varying degree in sixty-eight of the seventy-five 
districts that comprise Nepal, and their presence was the strongest in the districts of 
Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Pyuthan and Kalikot.60 Emboldened by their successes, 
the CPN (M) helped to establish the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and 
Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), a group composed of ten parties from 
Bangladesh, India, Bhutan and Sri Lanka with the purpose of unifying and coordinating 
the activities of the Maoist parties and organizations in South Asia to spread protracted 
people’s war in the region.61   
Both Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, along with Mohan Vaidya Pokharel 
(Kiran), still operate as the leaders of the party, which has operated as a legal political 
party since the ceasefire in 2006 that effectively ended the civil war in Nepal.  
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Throughout the course of the people’s war, the Prachanda and Bhattarai had their share 
of differences, yet they seemed to be personal rather than theoretical.62 However, after 
the fighting ended and the CPN (M) had to make the transition to parliamentary politics, 
the theoretical differences between Prachanda, Bhattarai, and Kiran started to become 
far more acute.63  Most recently, in 2011, Bhattarai made the news for walking out of a 
party meeting when he was not allowed to put forth his political line, which stressed 
peace and the implementation of the constitution as well as the importance of not 
antagonizing India. However, the official party line, backed by Prachanda and Kiran, 
maintained that the people’s principal contradiction is with “Indian expansionism and 
domestic reactionaries” and “people’s revolt” is the roadmap if a people’s federal 
democratic republican constitution was not promulgated.64  Even though the people’s 
war came to an end in 2006, it appears that Prachanda and Kiran are advocating for a 
return to revolution if Nepal is not established along a certain political path, whereas 
Bhattarai appears to be increasingly marginalized. 
The Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
India, in comparison to the other two countries, has the longest history of Maoist 
rebellion, starting in the mid 1960s with the formation of a leftist faction within the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal.  
Economist Amartya Sen described in a sobering manner the affect of Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s economic policies, which were being implemented at this time:  
[India] had, in terms of morbidity, mortality and longevity, suffered an excess in 
mortality over China of close to 4 [million] a year during the same period [1958-
1961]…Thus, in this one geographical area alone, more deaths resulted from 
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‘this failed capitalist experiment’ (more than 100 million by 1980) than can be 
attributed to the ‘failed communist experiment’ all over the world since 1917.65  
 
Inspired by Majumdar’s “Historic Eight Documents” which argued for an armed 
revolution based upon the example of the Chinese Revolution, a militant peasant 
uprising took place in Naxalbari in 1967.66  Initially, the Naxalbari uprising was 
expected to ignite a widespread peasant insurrection, however, the peasant fighters, 
brandishing knives, sickles, and the occasional archaic firearm, were soundly defeated 
by well-armed government forces.67  That same year, Majumdar and Sanyal formed a 
new group, the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries which 
eventually morphed into the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).  Despite the 
death of General Secretary Majumdar at the hands of the police in 1972, intermittent 
fighting continued in the countryside, although it was often lead by one of numerous 
permutations of the old party.68  After years of security operations against the rebels, 
turf wars between the various factions, and proscription against communist parties 
imposed at various times by the central government and affected states, several of the 
major leaders, including Muppala Lakshmana Rao (Ganapathi) and Mallojula 
Koteswara Rao (Kishenji) realized that strength lies in unity.  Thus, the Communist 
Party of India (Maoist) was the amalgamation of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist–Leninist) People’s War and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC), a 
merger that took place in 2004.69   
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The current manifestation of the party includes Ganapathi as general secretary.  
He presides over the decision making body, known as the Politburo, consisting of 
fourteen members (six of whom were killed or arrested between 2007 and 2010, the two 
most prominent being Azad and Kohad Ghandy).  Kishenji is a Politburo member as 
well, yet he also functions as the head of the Eastern Regional Bureau, with most of his 
activity focusing on the Lalgarh area of West Bengal, and he appears to possess a 
sizable amount of leverage within the party.70 Underneath the Politburo is the Central 
Committee, which then acts to disseminate information to Regional Bureaus, State 
Committees, Zonal Committees, District Committees, and armed squads.71  Directions 
are then passed on to the main fighting force, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, 
with an estimated 10,000-20,000 fighters.  Arundhati Roy, a journalist who has spent 
time traveling within Maoist-held base areas, describes some of the people who 
constitute the ranks of the Maoist guerrilla organization in a very vivid and somewhat 
benign manner:  
…the Maoists’ guerrilla army is made up almost entirely of desperately poor 
tribal people living in conditions of such chronic hunger that it verges on 
famine of the kind we only associate with sub-Saharan Africa. They are people 
who, even after 60 years of India’s so-called Independence, have not had access 
to education, healthcare or legal redress. They are people who have been 
mercilessly exploited for decades, consistently cheated by small businessmen 
and moneylenders, the women raped as a matter of right by police and forest 
department personnel. Their journey back to a semblance of dignity is due in 
large part to the Maoist cadre who have lived and worked and fought by their 
side for decades.  If the tribals have taken up arms, they have done so because a 
government which has given them nothing but violence and neglect now wants 
to snatch away the last thing they have—their land. Clearly, they do not believe 
the government when it says it only wants to “develop” their region. Clearly, 
they do not believe that the roads as wide and flat as aircraft runways that are 
being built through their forests in Dantewada by the National Mineral 
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Development Corporation are being built for them to walk their children to 
school on. They believe that if they do not fight for their land, they will be 
annihilated. That is why they have taken up arms.72 
Besides functioning within the rural areas, the CPI (M) has increased its efforts within 
many towns and cities across India, including Delhi, Bhopal, Jabalpur, Indore, Rourkela, 
Kolkata, Ranchi, Patna, Gorakhpur, Allahabad, and Lucknow, to name just a few.73 
Despite the obvious setbacks the movement has faced, including the death or 
imprisonment of several of its leaders and the initiation of the government’s “Operation 
Green Hunt”, it continues to increase its actions against the Indian state, drawing on the 
examples of the Nepalese Maoists and the Shining Path, as well as the 1967 Naxalbari 
uprising.   
Since the CPI (M) has lost several of its important Politburo members, it appears 
to be pursuing a more decentralized approach, with party members like Kishenji 
operating in particular regions holding considerable influence in determining strategy 
and tactics.  This may help the CPI (M) strengthen its footing in the various regions it 
operates in, since each regional leader would theoretically be more knowledgeable of his 
area of operation.  However, this may also lead to a disconnect in pursued strategy by 
the party as a whole, illustrated by the confusion over the issuing of a bandh (general 
strike), where Kishenji promoted a different point of view from Politburo member 
Anand and Dandakaranya special zonal committee chief Gudsa Usendi.74  Azad also 
alluded to, in an interview before his death, about the divergence between Kishenji and 
the central committee of the party.  When asked whether certain statements made by 
                                                 
72
 Arundhati Roy, quoted in Žižek, Slavoj. Living in the End Times. 394-395. 
73
 Ramana, P.V. “India’s Maoist Insurgency: Evolution, Current Trends, and Responses.” 35. 
74
 Bhattacharya, Snigdhendu. “Confusion in Maoist ranks over bandh date.” Hindustan Times 2010. 
 25 
 
Kishenji concerning a dialogue with the government could be viewed as authoritative, 
Azad responded: 
As regards Kishenji’s statements, they should be seen with a positive attitude, 
not with cynicism. Though our central committee has not discussed our specific 
strategy with regard to talks with the government at the current juncture, as a 
Polit Bureau member, comrade Kishenji had taken initiative and made a concrete 
proposal for a ceasefire. Whether comrade Kishenji’s statements are the official 
pronouncements of our Central Committee is not the point of debate here.75 
Even though it seemed like Azad was trying to deflect the question in a manner as to not 
implicate or criticize Kishenji, it did seem as if there was some surprise about the 
statements.  The party also exhibited some disagreements towards the developments of 
the CPN (M).  Azad spoke in a definitive manner on the CPN (M)’s foray into 
parliamentary politics, saying, “Our Party looks at the election results in Nepal as a 
positive development with enormous significance for the people of entire South Asia.”76 
It is not entirely surprising that Kisenji, when asked about Nepal, stated rather bluntly, 
“What the Maoists in Nepal are doing is wrong.”77 
The CPN (M) and the Shining Path were both considered more unified than the 
Indian Maoists, especially since the latter party’s current manifestation only took shape 
in 2004, and prior to that, numerous Maoist and communist factions existed, many of 
which carried out sporadic guerilla operations.78  These differences have also been 
reflected in the extent of the war in each country.  Nepal and Peru both experienced a 
countrywide Maoist insurgency, whereas India has seen pockets of insurgency.  Because 
                                                 
75
 “Edited text of 12,262-word response by Azad, Spokesperson, Central Committee, CPI (Maoist).” 
76
 “Interview with comrade Azad, spokesperson of the CC, CPI (Maoist) on the present developments in 
Nepal.” 
77
 Mittal, Tusha. “I am the Real Desh Bhakt.” 
78
 Shah, Alpa, and Judith Pettigrew. “Windows into a revolution: ethnographies of Maoism in South Asia.” 
226. 
 26 
 
Nepal and Peru contained viable, unified insurgent groups that operated throughout a 
large percentage of the country, each of the two countries militarized to an extent not 
experienced in India.  For example, in Peru in 1992, the President Alberto Fujimori 
carried out, with the support of the military, a “self-coup”, in which congress was shut 
down and the constitution suspended, allowing him to declare martial law and 
concentrate his efforts in combating the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement.79 In Nepal, after the bizarre 2001 regicide in which the king 
and queen were murdered by their son, Prince Dipendra, the new king, Gyanendra, 
wasted little time in imposing emergency rule, and, in order to combat the Maoist threat, 
the King accrued  millions of dollars in weaponry as well as military training from both 
the United States and India.80 Before India initiated “Operation Green Hunt” in 
November 2009 in the Gadchiroli district, combating the Maoists was generally the 
responsibility of the individual state governments, and coordination between the police 
and intelligence agencies of various affected states was far from satisfactory.81  In the 
case of the Indian Maoists, further actions, particularly military, would have to be 
coordinated in order to combat a concerted government military expedition.82  The 
purpose of this paper will be to distinguish whether a strongly centralized authority 
structure, like that found within the Shining Path or CPN (M) movements, or a relatively 
decentralized model, becoming more apparent within the CPI (M), exhibits a consistent 
coordination of efforts and policy.                    
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                                          Women and the Party 
There can be no liberation for the working class unless women 
are completely liberated.83                                                                                   
-V.I. Lenin 
The doors of the Communist Party stood open to women of 
the working class, and…gave them every opportunity to 
participate in the work of the Soviets to reshape their way of 
life and thus improve their own living conditions.84         
 –Alexandra Kollontai, “The Woman Worker and Peasant in 
Soviet Russia.” 
 
According to Guzmán, in an interview he afforded El Diario in 1988, the key to 
ending the years of suffering of the Peruvian people, and in particular, those living in 
rural areas, was, “To place Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in command. And with Maoism 
principally, take up people’s war, which is universally applicable, taking into account the 
character of each revolution and the specific conditions of each country.”85 In that 
interview, he defines problems and solutions in terms of class, and barely mentions the 
problems of women or their role in the revolution.  However, in a private conversation, 
Guzmán reportedly stated:  
We must see that we sidestepped the popular feminine movement, women being the 
half that holds up the sky; to fight the enemy that is transitorily strong with one arm 
tied behind one’s back is foolish. The struggle for the emancipation of the woman is 
part of the liberation of the proletariat- this is the Communist way of understanding 
the problem- from which derives equality before the law and equality in life.86  
 
Shining Path members, while engaged in fighting and setting up base areas, also adhered 
to Mao’s “The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention”, 
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specifically the point, “do not take liberties with women.”87  During the duration of the 
movement, women played an instrumental role in legitimizing the ideology of the 
Shining Path, as teachers, members, martyrs and heroic images used for propaganda.  
Edith Lagos was one of the first female Shining Path leaders and her death in 1982, while 
in police custody, symbolized the female plight and intensified the importance of women 
within the movement. In Ayacucho, a town of 70,000 people, nearly 20,000 people 
attended her funeral.88  By 1981, half of the teachers (most of whom were women) in 
Ayacucho Region had received their degrees from the Shining Path-controlled UNSCH 
Education Department.89  By 1990, women made up approximately one-third of the 
revolutionary group’s membership, and many women rose to prominent leadership 
roles.90 The Shining Path claimed that 40 percent of its guerilla army consisted of 
women.91 According to Gonzalez-Perez, “throughout the 1980s, a large number of 
women were involved at all levels of the organization, right up to the top positions in 
both the regional commands and the National Central Committee”, and that in 1993, after 
the arrest of Guzmán, the group was controlled by women such as Laura Zambrano and 
Elena Iparraguirre.92  These two women, along with six others, occupied a position within 
the Central Committee (out of 19 total spots).93 Women still existed as a minority in the 
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movement, even during the high points of Shining Path expansion; however, women 
achieved a visibility never before seen in any political party in Peruvian history.94   
In 1990, greater space was offered to women for political action in collaboration 
with the state, brought on by policies of decentralization and regionalization initiated by 
the Alan García regime.95 Within Peru’s parliament, the APRA party and CAMBIO ’90 
had five female representatives, while the FREDEMO had four.96 However, in areas 
dominated by the Shining Path, generally the state’s reach was tenuous, political parties 
were nascent or altogether absent and civil society was weak.97 Historically, in the rural 
areas, public space and political activity were generally off limits to poor women, and 
most local political representation and decision making was reserved for men.  Most of 
the political parties in Peru, even into the 1980s, focused most of their attention on 
organized associations of workers, students, professionals, etc, that were dominated by 
men, and if women did participate to any large degree in politics, they tended to be 
relatively affluent, urban dwellers.98  Oftentimes, party officials that were elected in the 
rural regions, especially candidates from the United Left or the APRA party, were 
targeted by the Shining Path for assassination, despite overwhelming support for the 
official.99  In response to these and other actions carried out by the Shining Path, the 
government helped numerous villages establish rondas (communal defense forces).  Even 
within this type of organization, women demonstrate little authority, evidenced by the 
fact that not a single woman was elected as commando or civil defense committee 
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president.100  Thus, government-backed institutions like the rondas perpetuated the 
second-class status of women in Peru. 
The type of revolutionary justice offered by the Shining Path appealed to many 
women within Andean communities. Wife-beaters, adulterers, and rapists were put on 
trial, and severe punishments were exacted.101 Later publications of Shining Path 
propaganda recount the role of the party in changing gender roles and combating 
inequality of the sexes, “Peru’s traditional Andean peasant culture is quite a lot more 
rigid than what is prevailing in the urban areas.  Peasant women who would stray from 
their husbands are severely punished but sexual harassment and adultery on the part of 
men is rather prevalent.  On the other hand, where the Party established its influence, 
divorce is introduced and sexual harassment is not tolerated.”102  The Shining Path did 
advocate for the use of violence, with Guzmán stating in his interview, “we start from the 
principle established by Chairman Mao Tse-tung: violence, that is the need for 
revolutionary violence, is a universal law with no exception. Revolutionary violence is 
what allows us to resolve fundamental contradictions by means of an army, through 
people’s war.”103  Some of this “revolutionary violence”, especially the use of systematic 
assassinations, was guided towards women, especially leaders of Peruvian women’s 
groups.  In a February 1992 issue of the party’s newspaper, El Diario, women’s 
organizations were the target of numerous vituperations, one of which branded the 
organizations as “an instrument of oppression and retardation of the woman with the goal 
of removing them from the path which the proletariat and the people have chosen with 
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popular war.”104 One of several prominent women’s leaders to be assassinated by the 
Shining Path, María Elena Moyano, described the battle between her organization and the 
Maoists: “While they are arousing a revolution, we are extinguishing it.”105 
Over the course of the people’s war in Peru, women were able to broaden their 
space of participation within the Shining Path. Under the conditions that manifested 
because of the war between the Shining Path and the Peruvian state, women were able to 
act in ways both maternal and political, illustrated by their roles as revolutionaries, 
soldiers, community organizers, nurses, and propagandists.106 Additionally, they 
participated in intelligence and military activities, commanded columns and operatives, 
and came to attain leadership positions in all areas of the organization.107  The group may 
have been somewhat selective in the type of women that could join the party, evidenced 
by a quote from a regional Shining Path leader who stated, “Not just any woman can be 
involved in the revolution. They have to be young, because as long as women remain 
unmarried and have no children, they are much more insensitive and colder than men and 
are thus willing to do anything.”108  Yet, the Shining Path was able to provide a tangible 
example of a “success” in that it was able to combat inequality, especially in a 
historically male-dominated rural society.  The Shining Path was, during the latter years 
of its existence, guilty of perpetrating attacks against women’s organizations, including 
the Metropolitan Organization of ‘Glass of Milk’ Committees and Soup Kitchens, 
established by a broad-based women’s movement in poor neighborhoods.  The struggle 
against “revisionism” by the party oftentimes warranted little more than senseless and 
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macabre murders of left-leaning political activists and women organizers including Maria 
Elena Moyano and others who were engaged in the establishment of “people’s 
organizations.”109  Disillusionment also manifested among the party’s base as well as 
throughout Peru as a result of patriarchal relations that were sometimes exploited by the 
party in order to get many of the female recruits to renounce work and study 
responsibilities as well as familial ties.110  Since the party had a very rigid definition of 
what constituted “revisionism”, thus allowing for the justification of attacks on non- or 
anti-Shining Path groups actively trying to combat gender inequality, poverty, etc, 
outside the framework of the Peruvian government (i.e. grass-roots movements), its 
overall efforts in the struggle against gender equality cannot be seen as “highly 
successful”. 
 Both the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Communist Party of India 
(Maoist) were influenced by, to varying degrees, the Shining Path’s example of people’s 
war, with the former viewing the final failure of the Peruvian group as “left 
deviationism”.111  Prachanda was, since 1996, viewed as the head of both the military and 
political wing of the CPN (M), similar to Guzmán (also similar to Guzmán, Prachanda 
has been known to quarrel with the number two in the organization, in this case Dr. 
Baburam Bhattarai, who felt unhappy about the power being consolidated under 
Prachanda).112 113  Another similarity that existed between the CPN (M) and the Shining 
Path was the policy towards women. Li Onesto, a journalist who had access to territory 
controlled by the CPN (M) wrote about an interview she had with a women soldier: 
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“Now all the members of my family are clear on the politics of the People’s War. All of 
them are in mass organizations and my younger…sister is going to school. She has 
passed class six and is teaching other people to read. When I was taking the adult 
education class I never had time to study. But in the People’s Army I have time to study 
reading and writing, and the other comrades help me. I can read newspapers and write 
letters now.”114  Women gradually became more involved in the movement, both in the 
People’s Army, and in leadership positions as well. According to Onesto: 
 As of 2003, there are several women in the Central Committee of the Party, dozens 
of women at the regional level, hundreds in the district level, and several thousands 
in the area and cell levels in the party…In the western region of Nepal alone, there 
are 1,500 women’s units. The total membership in the women’s mass organization is 
600,000. In the military field, there are 10 women section commanders in the main 
force, two women platoon commanders in the secondary force and several militia 
commanders in the basic force. And the team commander of the health section of a 
battalion force is a woman.115 
 
Women were not simply casual members of the party; they were present within every 
level of leadership, from the top down to the rural committee level and in some cases, 
served as military commanders. 
Women were able to play a myriad of roles within the party and the people’s 
army, yet this was not an instantaneous occurrence, rather, a protracted process.  
Prachanda admitted as much, stating, “Before initiation (of the people’s war), the women 
question was not so seriously debated in our party. That was our weakness.”116  That 
initial disregard of the “woman question” was brought to the forefront after the 
publishing of “The Question of Women’s Leadership in the People’s War in Nepal” in 
1999 by Hisila Yami (Parvati), a member of the CPN (M) Central Committee, a pamphlet 
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which basically stated that despite women supporting the people’s war in large numbers, 
showing similar sacrifice and devotion as male members of the people’s army, few 
women had been elevated into leadership roles.  However, in a 2006 interview, Parvati 
was more optimistic, stating that women were the driving force behind the movement, 
which, according to estimates, was 30-50 percent female.117 In comparison, the Nepali 
Congress, one of the largest political parties in Nepal, had, in 2005, an estimated female 
contingent of 15 percent (a number which had only risen 2 percent by August 2010).  
Also, in 2010, it afforded just seven women a leadership position in the party’s 71-
member Central Working Committee, resulting in charges that the Nepali Congress 
provides little space for women at the decision-making level.118  The Communist Party of 
Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) also has demonstrated a low level of female 
involvement and has never had more than three to five female members within its central 
committee.119  Public leaders in both the CPN (UML) and the NC have been accused of 
focusing on narrow self-interest and not the issues of the public as well as being in 
collusion with the business sector, meaning that support from women has either 
decreased or risen at a very slow rate.120  Oftentimes, women were nominated for 
positions of leadership because of mandates included within the Nepalese constitution. 
Promulgated in 1990, the constitution provided women with equal political rights 
including the right to vote, compete in local and national elections, and become involved 
in political parties. Constitutional provisions were then introduced that made it 
compulsory for political parties to nominate at least five per cent of women candidates 
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for the House of Representatives, and to provide for seven seats for women in the 
National Assembly.121  
Besides leadership positions, women featured prominently as combatants, 
propagandists, farmers, organizers, cultural activists, nurses and spies.122 Maoist 
women’s organizations were formed both in the cities and the countryside, and in Rolpa 
and Rukum, a majority of the women belonged to one of these organizations.123 When 
asked about the role of the women’s organizations, a female organizer from Rukum 
stated: 
In the early days, we started by raising the consciousness of women, like talking 
about the struggle for equal rights. And we opposed the conservative traditions 
that oppress women, like the practice where if a women is married to a man in the 
countryside, the man’s family has to pay a dowry…So we say that this amounts to 
the selling of women. So we oppose this kind of practice. Also, in some areas, we 
have been able to stop men drinking alcohol and as a result, a lot of wife-beating 
has stopped. So, in a practical way, many women are attracted to the 
revolutionary women’s organization because of these kinds of things. We also 
opposed child marriages and polygamy and we’ve organized mass actions against 
polygamy.124 
 
The women’s organizations also set up political workshops and literacy classes.125 
Within the context of civil war, both the state forces and the CPN (M) forces 
committed violence against women, but the former targeted women more frequently and 
in many cases, sexual violence was part of the repertoire.126  This may be because any 
sort of law against domestic violence in Nepal is virtually absent and because there is no 
accountability meaning that the security personnel are not appropriately punished for 
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committing heinous crimes like rape and murder.127 The CPN (M) had a law in place 
making it a crime for women to have relatives in the state security forces, and in several 
districts (Dhangadhi and Morang) women were targeted and killed if they were married 
to a security forces member.128  As in Peru, however, the use of people’s courts appears 
to have been ubiquitous, and punishments were frequently meted out against rapists and 
husbands who beat their wives.129  The utilization of revolutionary violence, which 
included the annihilation of enemies, was a blend of Maoism with the thought of Charu 
Majumdar (the Indian revolutionary who advocated for a “battle of annihilation”)130, and 
it seems that violence against women, if it did occur, happened within this context 
primarily (the women were viewed as enemies or targeted for reasons other than being “a 
woman”).  Yet, many women in Nepal blamed the government for their suffering rather 
than the rebels who began the war and expressed clear support for the Maoist values and 
goals.131 The CPN (M) suggested its desire to distinguish itself from the Shining Path in 
that it did not target female organizers and was able to more effectively deal with the 
issues of patriarchy and female leadership within the party.  Combined with the 
pervasiveness of Maoist women’s organizations and the vast numbers of women serving 
as either guerillas or within a non-combat role in the base areas, it can be said that, in a 
struggle against women’s inequality in Nepal, the CPN (M) has been “highly successful”.  
This does not mean, however, that mistakes did not occur or that there is not room for 
improvement.  Providing meaningful opportunities for women within the party was a 
gradual process, which, according to Prachanda, was not seen as an immediate concern.  
                                                 
127
 “Nepal: One Year of Royal Anarchy.” Asian Centre for Human Rights. 43. 
128
 Ibid., 44. 
129
 Onesto, Li. Dispatches form the People’s War in Nepal. 175. 
130
 Ram, Mohan. Maoism in India. 129. 
131
 Leve, Lauren. “Women’s empowerment and rural revolution: rethinking ‘failed development’.” 355. 
 37 
 
Yet, in an interview with Baburam Bhattarai, he stated that in 2003, fifty percent of 
cadres at the lower level, thirty percent of soldiers and ten percent of members of central 
committee of the outfit were women, illustrating tremendous maturity in party policy 
concerning women.132  Women were the victims of violence at the hands of the CPN (M), 
however, the party never devolved into the extremes of their Peruvian counterparts.  
Since the outbreak of the Naxalbari uprisings in 1967, women have served in the 
Maoist people’s armies in India. The CPI (M) has published a book entitled, Women 
Martyrs of the Indian Revolution (Naxalbari to 2010), which tells the stories of more than 
500 women killed in the movement, most of them victims of sexual violence at the hands 
of the government-backed troops and militias, such as the Salwa Judum, which operated 
in Chhattisgarh, India.  The party has stated that the book was released in order to 
stimulate female recruitment, using glorified stories of daring exploits and martyrdom of 
female cadre, a group that makes up roughly 30 percent of the party.133  Groups like the 
Salwa Judum appear to have been abandoned, with Chief Minister Raman Singh 
describing the movement as over because it was counterproductive and “innocent people 
were being killed”,134 yet the problems faced by women remain fundamentally 
unchanged throughout India.  Within the party, issues of gender relation and 
discrimination have been addressed, starting, most significantly, with a rectification 
program carried out by the People’s War Group in 1995 meant to assuage the tension that 
existed between the sexes.  The larger purpose of this program was to bring about 
awareness on issues of patriarchy and to eliminate it, and because of initiatives like this 
one, the number of women coming into the party today is higher than the number of 
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men.135  The CPI (M) employs revolutionary violence, and women have been abducted or 
killed generally because they have been labeled “police informers.”136  Sexual violence 
on the part of the CPI (M) appears rare, and the party has been particularly trenchant in 
its criticism of the “ruling classes and their armed forces using violence against women as 
one of their weapons.”137 In a 9th Congress Party document entitled, “Resolution on State 
Violence Against Women”, the party proclaims a call-to-arms, declaring, “The Unity 
Congress’ 9th Congress calls upon all sections of women and democrats to oppose the 
violence being perpetrated by the state forces and vigilante forces on women. It also calls 
upon them to oppose the violence in the name of Salwa Judum, the cold-blooded killings 
in the name of encounters and the arrest of politically active women...This Congress calls 
upon all oppressed, exploited women to rise up against oppression and join the 
revolutionary movement for liberation.”138 
In India, in order to increase the number of women participating in politics, 
the Panchayat Raj, a system of decentralized, regional authority, was implemented.  As a 
result, over a million women have actively entered political life in India.139  The 73rd and 
74th Constitutional Amendment Acts specifically call for all local elected bodies to 
reserve one-third of their seats for women.140 Although the percentages of women in 
various levels of political activity have risen considerably, women are still under-
represented in governance and decision-making positions. For instance, the number of 
women in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha (the two houses of Parliament) is 
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abysmally low (8.8 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively).141  In two of the states heavily 
affected by the Maoists, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, women make up 9.5 and 5.8 percent, 
respectively, of the state assemblies.142  The Bharatiya Janata Party, out of all of the 
major Indian political parties, seemed to have the most female members in leadership 
positions, however, they only accounted for 12.5 percent, meaning that very few of the 
parties actually place women in key leadership roles.143  On the other hand, the Maoists 
have established regional authority which appears to be more egalitarian in practice.  For 
example, in the village of Lalgarh, a mass organization known as the PCPA materialized, 
initially under the leadership of women.  These organizations spread to many nearby 
villages as well, along with a new type of governing structure, know as Gram 
Committees, which are seen as alternative to the Panchayat system.144  Each committee 
consists of a ten-member elected body, consisting of five men and five women. Two of 
these delegates attend larger area meetings, consisting of ten villages.  According to 
Shell, “Above those committees are a total of 35 representatives for central committee 
meetings (with females occupying a minimum of 12 seats) who play governing roles.”145 
Twelve women out of 35 total seats is still 34 percent, a much higher percentage of 
women than what is normally seen within the Panchayat system, composed of “legally 
recognized” political parties. 
 The majority of the women who work within or support the CPI (M) are 
agricultural laborers and poor peasants, and it is these people who have been forming the 
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basis of movements for women’s equality and liberation since the 1970s.146 Many of the 
women are drawn to the movement because of the promises of a future egalitarian society 
(which was understood as including gender equality).147  However, there have been 
instances when expectation and reality share an antithetical relationship, illustrated, most 
forcefully, within the institution of “revolutionary marriage.” For some women, the 
reality became that once they were married to a party cadre, their political involvement 
was curbed significantly and their place in the home was firmly entrenched.148  Even 
though there has been a perpetuation of bourgeois gender roles to a certain extent within 
the Indian Maoist movement, the leader Ganapathi has stated: 
…we have never said there are no shades of patriarchy in the party or that the men 
and women comrades haven’t become its victims. We are fighting against the 
manifestations of patriarchy by increasing the political consciousness of our 
comrades and people, by taking up anti-patriarchal rectification campaigns and 
more than anything, increasing the consciousness, self-confidence and 
individuality of the women comrades and implementing pro-women policies 
firmly…In fact, in the ongoing revolutionary movement and people’s war under 
our party’s leadership women are participating on a large scale. The participation 
of women in the struggles against various forms of patriarchy, under our party’s 
leadership is very inspiring to us.  It is an undeniable fact that no where else in our 
country and under no other party is there such a huge mobilization of women as in 
our party.149 
 
It is hard to dispute that tremendous numbers of women have gravitated towards the CPI 
(M), making up sections of the guerilla army and operating as organizers, propagandists, 
nurses, agricultural workers, etc, in the base areas situated within the “Red Corridor”, 
which consists of parts of Andhra 
Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar 
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Pradesh and West Bengal states, however, it has yet to be seen whether or not the types 
of campaigns that Ganapathi discussed have been met with any sort of success.  Yet, the 
CPI (M)’s acknowledgment of the problems that face women and that existed even 
within the party as well as their efforts to rectify previous negative trends shares 
similarity with the example of the Nepalese Maoists, and thus, they can be deemed 
“highly successful,” to this point in time. 
 In each of the three cases, and despite the differences in party structure, the 
movement was able to attract a significant amount of women, particularly due to its 
deliverance of “popular justice” by way of people’s courts.  Even though the Shining 
Path, through its excessive use of violence and its targeting of independent women’s 
organizations, progressively alienated sections of its support base, including women, it 
did promote gender equality, both in word and in action, resulting in over 30 percent of 
its party consisting of women.  Thus, its efforts, even though not “highly successful”, due 
to the previously mentioned setbacks, were at least highly coordinated and diligently 
carried out.  The latter two groups, the CPN (M) and the CPI (M), actively sought to 
correct issues of patriarchy and inequality within the party, and in doing so, also strove to 
include women in all levels of the organization.  Even though the CPI (M) is not highly 
centralized in the same manner as the CPN (M), both parties were able to recruit larger 
numbers of women than any of the legal political parties that were functioning at the 
same time.  Therefore, the efforts of both the CPN (M) and the CPI (M) could be 
considered highly coordinated and “highly successful.”  The next section looks at the 
territory controlled by each group, with the assumption, based upon the hypothesis, that a 
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centralized party will be able to spread throughout more territory due to a superior 
military prowess. 
                                               
Rebel-Controlled Territory 
Every Communist must grasp the truth, “Political power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Our principle is that that 
Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed 
to command the Party.150                                                            
-Mao Tse-tung 
Since in our time all the reactionary ruling classes have a tight 
grip on the main cities, it is necessary for a revolutionary 
political party to utilize the vulnerable links and areas of 
reactionary rule, fully arouse the masses, conduct guerrilla 
warfare, establish stable revolutionary bases and so build up 
and temper their own forces and, through prolonged fighting, 
strive step by step for complete victory in the revolution.151                                                                                               
–Lin Biao 
 In the case of the three groups, the party had the responsibility of creating and 
controlling armies, oftentimes made up of a blend of rural recruits and idealistic students.  
In this sense, the party always “commanded the gun.”  In a Shining Path document 
entitled, “The Truth About the People’s War in Peru”, the group identified five stages of 
the revolution as follows: 
1) Agitation and armed propaganda, First actions and training of the combatants 
in attacks with limited objectives. This lasted from May 1980 until the end of 
1981.                                                                                                                        
2) Systematic sabotage and initiation of the first regular guerrilla actions destined 
to destroy the power of the bourgeois landowner in the zones chosen to be the 
bases of support. This lasted all of 1982.                                                                                                                                            
3) Generalization of the guerrilla war and the beginning of the creation of support 
bases, behind the expulsion of the reactionary authorities. This extended 
throughout the entire year of 1983 and had to face the intervention of the army.                                                                         
4) Conquest of the bases of support, establishing in them the power of the Popular 
Committees and strengthening the militias and popular army…Expansion of the 
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popular army to new zones (including the city as an auxiliary activity) to obtain 
the dispersion of enemy forces…                  
5) Generalized civil war. The popular army will depart the liberated zones to 
surround the cities…Complete destruction of the reactionaries, and the installation 
throughout Peru of the Popular Republic of New Democracy as the concrete form 
of the first stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat.152 
   
 This was certainly one of the most explicit and detailed plans of attack issued by any 
rebel group.  The Shining Path was diligent in following this strategy, and throughout the 
1980s, was able to increase the amount of territory it controlled as well as the number of 
militants in its organization.  In the Andean highlands in particular, the Shining Path 
initially gained support from local peasants by filling the political void left by the central 
government or by actively chasing out or murdering government officials and other state 
representatives in order to paralyze and eliminate local government institutions.153 The 
Shining Path, once establishing its authority in a particular area, would embark on a 
campaign of “popular justice” which caused the peasantry of many Peruvian villages to 
express some sympathy for the group, especially in the impoverished and neglected 
regions of Ayacucho, Apurímac, Junín, Cerro de Pasco and Huancavelica.154  After large 
numbers of community leaders, administrators, and other “traitors” were rounded up and 
tried at a “people’s court”, they would be hanged, shot, or beaten, depending on the 
seriousness of their “crimes against the revolution”, and afterwards, the Shining Path 
would declare the region to be a “zone of liberation.”155 
 The Popular Guerrilla Army was the name for the militias established by the 
Shining Path in their base areas, and it was divided up into a “principle force” (which 
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operates regionally), a “local force” and a “base force” (confined to specific villages).156  
In the late 1980s, with nearly 25,000 militants, the Shining Path controlled almost 25 
percent of Peru’s municipalities and was supported by roughly 15 percent of 
Peruvians.157  The Shining Path seemed to build strength during the presidency of Alan 
García (1985-1990) despite his creation of “rondas campesinas”, peasant brigades armed 
by the government with the intention of slowing down the advance of the Shining Path.158  
Despite alienation or disillusionment among Peruvians caused by the movement’s 
exceptional reliance on the use of violence, during the García presidency, the conditions 
that made the Shining Path appealing in the first place (extreme poverty, government 
corruption and inefficiency, etc) continued to exist, and as the García administration 
unsuccessfully sought a military solution to counter the growing threat, it committed 
numerous human rights violations.  After incidents like the Accomarca massacre, where 
47 peasants were gunned down by Peruvian armed forces in August 1985, the Cayara 
massacre in which some thirty people were killed and dozens disappeared (after they 
were suspected of being Shining Path sympathizers), and the summary execution of more 
than 200 inmates during prison riots in Lurigancho, San Juan Bautista and Santa Bárbara 
in 1986, many peasants, fearing the government military forces, joined the Shining 
Path.159 
 By 1991, Sendero controlled nearly a third of Peru and had made considerable 
progress in separating Lima from the countryside.160  As leader of the Shining Path, 
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Guzmán was know to express contempt towards foreign powers and ideas (other than 
Marxism), and he viewed Alberto Fujimori, the Peruvian Presidential candidate of 
Japanese decent, as an image of external intervention. When Fujimori was sworn into 
office, the Shining Path increased the intensity of its attacks in both the rural areas and in 
Lima.161 However, Fujimori was able to, after a long and significantly brutal counter-
terrorism campaign, accomplish what his predecessor could not; capture Guzmán, 
effectively beheading the Shining Path and decreasing their influence throughout Peru (in 
1992, the Shining Path controlled nearly 30 percent of the country, whereas in 1995, the 
movement only controlled 8 percent of the country).162 163  Perhaps Guzmán, in directing 
the military activities of his party, forgot to heed the advice of Mao, who had written, “If 
we insisted on leading the masses to do anything against their will, we would certainly 
fail.”164 The massive military campaign waged by the Fujimori government against the 
Shining Path caused, ultimately, the demise of the party (which actually still exists today, 
but as two, distinct, fragmented groups with only a few hundred fighters each),165 yet, the 
group also lost support due to its use of utilizing its militias to carry out reprisal killings 
of suspected collaborators and massacres of villages supporting the rondas or 
unsympathetic to the movement.166  It is impressive that the movement was able to 
control nearly 30 percent of the country, however, it could not conquer Lima, a city 
populated by a large majority of Peru’s 9.8 million people living below the poverty line, 
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many of whom were sympathetic to the initial aims of the movement.167  A great decline 
in the amount of territory controlled was not experienced until after Guzmán was 
captured, but it seemed that the movement was, from the late 1980s to 1992, largely 
static, in the respect that it did not increase the territory under its control by any 
significant margin.  The establishment of the rondas campesinas by García and the 
increased reliance upon them by Fujimori, along with the movement’s provocation of 
community rivalry and use of reprisal killings (especially against peasant leaders)168 may 
have significantly decreased the Shining Path’s potential for expansion.  Guzmán never 
concealed his desire to set up bases throughout the rural, predominantly Quechua-
speaking areas, and because the Shining Path was able to build the party in places like 
Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac.169 a strong level of coordination existed between 
the leader of the party and the lower level members engaged in carrying out political and 
military work in the various “zones of liberation”.  However, it was only “successful” and 
not “highly successful”, since it did not exceed 30 percent control of the country and it 
alienated potential bases for support when its practice of “revolutionary violence” seemed 
to spiral out of control. 
 On February 13, 1996, the first actions of what was to become a ten-year long 
people’s war occurred in the districts of Rolpa and Rukum which were previously known 
for their spectacular mountains and even more spectacular poverty.170  Over the next 
several weeks, Nepal experienced over 5000 small- and large-scale actions throughout 
the country, instigated by the CPN (M).  The Nepalese government, under King Birendra, 
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offered its first comprehensive response to the Maoist threat in 1998, Kilo Sera 2, which 
transferred thousands of specially rained armed police forces to 20 of the country’s 75 
districts.171  After the first several months of the counterinsurgency, during which at least 
200 people were killed, Prachanda stated: 
On the basis of this outlook the Nepalese reactionary ruling classes “declared” 
that they would wipe-out the people’s forces within one and half to two months 
and resorted to state terrorism with mass arrest, torture, pillage and genocide. The 
masses, the Party and the-revolutionary fighters continued to resist this by setting 
historic examples of devotion and sacrifice…What was the result? The result was 
consistent with what happens in genuine revolutionary movements all over the 
world. The result was as per the prognosis of the invincible ideology of Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism…here was an even bigger wave of people’s sympathy and co-
operation for the People’s War. That thousands are replacing the hundreds and 
hundreds of thousands are replacing the thousands! They realized that People’s 
War cannot be easily wished away, that it was a fundamentally a new type of 
war.172 
Until 2001, the guerrilla forces of the CPN (M) embarked on small-scale actions (raiding 
police posts or attacking landlords or politicians) while armed with archaic weapons.  
Their actions, however, sometimes lead to the seizure and redistribution of land and were 
greeted with support among many impoverished villagers who witnessed oppressive 
mayors or officials run out of town and who benefited from social, economic and 
political transformations that the Maoists strove to implement.173 In 2001, a ceasefire was 
implemented, as the leaders of the CPN (M) and the government engaged in peace talks, 
however, after blaming the government for not responding to any of their conditions, the 
Maoists walked out of the dialogue and almost immediately stepped up armed attacks.174  
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Later that year, the Maoists announced the formation of the “People’s Liberation Army” 
to carry forward the people’s war in a more structured, unified manner.175 
 With a new army came the expansion into new territory and the establishment of 
political authority and organization in the villages.  The CPN (M) divided the areas where 
it was active into three zones: “Guerrilla zones,” where a police presence was being 
combated by Maoist armed resistance; “Propaganda zones,” mainly in urban areas, where 
the Nepali regime’s presence remained strong and the main aim was to prepare the 
ground for eventual insurrection; and “Main zones,” which were areas where the setting 
up of a base in order to establish “red political power” was the overall goal.176 By 2003, 
the government’s presence in the countryside, if it existed, was inconspicuous and hardly 
consequential.  By this point, the Maoists had established base areas in the Eastern, 
Western, and Central Regions and claimed to have ten million of Nepal’s 23 million 
people living under the authority of the CPN (M).177 Nepal’s government even put 
forward an estimate of CPN (M) military strength in 2003, indicating that that there were 
approximately 9,500 combatants, 25,000 militia, 150,500 active cadres and over 100,000 
sympathizers with the fighting forces consisting of ethnic groups including the 
Magars, Tharus, Limbus, Tamangs, Dalits, Brahmins and Chhetris.178   
By 2002, both India and the United States were providing Nepal with military aid 
in order to defeat to Maoist threat, which seemed to be metastasizing at an alarming rate. 
Because of the munificence of Washington and Delhi, the Royal Nepal Army was able to 
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expand to over 90,000 troops and embarked on a renewed counterinsurgency campaign, 
encompassing parts of the country it had never previously operated in.179  Despite the 
renewed aggression by the Royal Nepal Army in 2005, the Maoists had spread to all but 
two of the country’s 75 districts and claimed to control 80 percent of the countryside.180 
The CPN (M) also maintained a visible presence within each of Nepal’s 75 districts.181  
Before the official end of the people’s war in 2006, the Nepali Maoists astonishingly 
were able to go from controlling about 5 percent of the country to well over 80 percent.  
What also makes this remarkable is that Nepal is comprised of 102 different castes and 
ethnic groups which, historically, co-existed peacefully, but more recently, with the 
institution of multi-party democracy, hierarchy, dominance and oppression has become 
more acute among the groups.182 As part of its foray into parliamentary politics, the CPN 
(M) had to disarm a percentage of the People’s Liberation Army, resulting in the handing 
over of 2,857 weapons to UN officials working in the area.  In the UN agreement, the 
Royal Nepal Army also agreed to turn in an equal cache in order to balance the power 
between the two militaries, which were to be gradually integrated.183 Part of the reason 
for this action was that the Nepalese government was afraid that the CPN (M) could re-
instigate the people’s war with the large fighting force that it had amassed, under the 
leadership of Prachanda.  Few other rebel groups have been as successful as the CPN (M) 
in gaining territory so quickly. High levels of coordination were required as the CPN (M) 
military operated throughout many of Nepal’s 75 districts, fighting the Royal Nepal 
Army and establishing base areas.  Speaking several years prior to the incitement of the 
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people’s war by the CPN (M), Baburam Bhattarai stated, “When we perform this new 
democratic revolution, we will immediately redistribute property. We will confiscate all 
landed property and redistribute the wealth among the poor.”184 To a great extent, the 
Maoist armies succeeded in this task, and in the process, won over many new recruits to 
the party.  Because the CPN (M), in the span of ten years, was able to seize control of 
nearly the entirety of Nepal, it must be viewed as “highly successful.” 
 India’s Maoist movement has experienced highs and lows during its 40 years of 
existence, but it seems to have undergone some remarkable growth in the last several 
years.  In 2003, the Maoists were said to be present in 55 districts in 9 states, but in 2008, 
operated in 220 districts in 22 states.185  The consolidation of the two largest Maoist 
groups in India in 2004 is certainly part of the reason for this success.  In India, the 
Maoists are estimated to have 7,300 weapons for 10,500 armed cadres nationwide, a 
25,000-strong people’s militia, and 50,000 members in village-level units.186  In 2009, 
there were also reports of a resurgence of Maoist activity in three tribal districts of West 
Bengal where the group was thought to have all but disappeared.187  Battles between the 
government and the Maoists have occurred in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, 
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh 
and Tamil Nadu188 and of particular interest is the struggle between the Maoists and the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), a legal political party.  Struggling against a 
supposedly “oppressive” party like the CPI (Marxist), in 2009, the CPI (M) conducted a 
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large campaign where they “liberated” 48 villages while taking control of several CPI 
(Marxist) buildings in Dharampur.189   
India contains over 80 million tribals, about 15 million of whom live in eastern 
states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Chhattisgarh.  It is estimated that the literacy rate 
among the tribals is about 23 percent, and at least half of them live below the poverty 
line.190 These types of conditions, complemented by a dismal security presence (54 police 
for ever 100 square kilometers in Bihar, 17 in Chhattisgarh), seemingly allowed for the 
rapid expansion of the Maoists in the impecunious tribal areas.191  Leaders of the CPI 
(M), especially Azad (before his death), laud the type of work being done by the Maoists 
in the newly established base areas. Azad stated in an interview: 
 
We have set up schools in villages where the government had never bothered to 
go. And where school buildings were built, these are used for accommodating the 
police and the central forces; there are no teachers worth the name in schools 
which exist only on paper. In all these villages it is our teachers who teach the 
boys and girls basic subjects and make them basically literate. We have developed 
the language of the adivasis, published text-books in their mother-tongue, and 
thus facilitated a flowering of their culture and rich heritage. There is also a 
conscious people’s movement for the preservation of forests and an improvement 
in agricultural productivity. Now no dispute in any of our villages goes to the 
police station, so naturally, the policemen are angry that they are losing their 
illegal incomes. Health conditions have significantly improved when compared to 
those existing a decade or two decades ago. We have set up basic medical 
facilities in the villages. However, all this development is taking place within the 
framework of the existing socio-economic system in the country and hence it has 
its limitations. Moreover, the incessant attacks by the Indian state and vigilante 
gangs sponsored by the state are obstructing development and even destroying 
what has been achieved.192 
 
Kishenji expanded on the issue of medical care, saying, “The CPI (Maoist) also sends 
medical help to 1,200 villages in India almost daily. In Bastar, our foot soldiers are 
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proficient doctors, wearing aprons, working as midwives in the jungle…We have 50 such 
mobile health teams and 100 mobile hospitals in Bastar itself.”193  However, outside of 
the Maoist ranks, the view seems to be a bit different.  Arundhati Roy talks about how the 
Maoist leaders are charged with having a vested interest in keeping people poor and 
illiterate in order to maintain authority over them.  She also writes, “critics ask why, after 
working in areas like Dandakaranya for thirty years, they still do not run schools and 
clinics, why they don’t check dams and advanced agriculture, and why people were still 
dying of malaria and malnutrition.”194 She goes on to make a point that it is quite difficult 
to promote development when the members of the CPI (M) are, in some instances, liable 
to be shot on sight, and also asserts that the government has a similar record of 
underdevelopment in non-Maoist controlled tribal areas.195  Yet, it seems as if the major 
drawing point for the Maoists is the utilization of popular justice, similar to both the 
Shining Path and the CPN (M).  Ranjan Kamath, a filmmaker who has traveled 
throughout Maoist-controlled territory, asserts that the CPI (M)’s use of people’s courts 
and their mobilization against state-sponsored militias such as the Salwa Judum or Ranvir 
Sena, has been viewed favorably, but that these techniques are all the Maoists have to 
offer.196  Despite a disagreement about the extent of work being carried out in Maoist 
base areas, the reality is that, “From two or three states, the movement has now spread to 
over 15 states, giving jitters to the ruling classes.”197 
When pressed about the violent nature of the Maoists in rural areas, Kishenji 
responded, “Our violence is counter violence…the PM should apologize to the tribals and 
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withdraw all the troops deployed in these areas…If the government agrees to this, there 
will be no violence from us. We will continue our movement in the villages like 
before.”198  Later in the interview, he stated, “Whether it’s Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal 
or Maharashtra, we never started the violence. The first attack always came from the 
government.”199 If these statements are interpreted literally, it seems that while the CPI 
(M) is following the first half of the Maoist slogan, “preserve oneself and destroy the 
enemy”, it is not interested in carrying out attacks against the government or military 
targets or spreading its zones of influence.  However, the CPI (M) has been responsible 
for ambushes on police forces, killing 38 members of the elite Greyhound forces in 
Orissa in 2008 and 74 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force in Chhattisgarh.200  
Yet in some instances, the actual violence perpetrated by the Maoists belies the threat 
they supposedly pose in military terms.  Chhattisgarh, the state most affected by 
government-Maoist violence, casualty figures are low enough as to not support the 16 
companies of special armed police that were sent there in 1998 or the 10 battalions of 
paramilitary forces currently posted there.201  It has yet to be seen the full effect of India’s 
Operation Green Hunt, the large paramilitary effort unleashed in the “red corridor” in 
2009, and how it affects the ability of the CPI (M) to garner popular support and preserve 
the area within its control. So far, it seems that little progress is actually being made by 
the Indian government, and in April 2010, the Maoists killed 75 military personnel in the 
forests of Chhattisgarh.  A top CPI (M) leader, Gopal, stated that the attack was a direct 
consequence of the government’s actions and later stated, “There has been no impact of 
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Operation Green Hunt on our cadres. We have become more alert since then. We believe 
that the time to engage in direct battle with the Central Government has now come. There 
is a new revolutionary zeal in our cadres.”202  Borrowing one of Mao’s favorite slogans, 
Ganapathi stated, “People, who are the makers of history, will rise up like a tornado 
under our party’s leadership to wipe out the reactionary blood-sucking vampires ruling 
our country.”203  Whether this will become a reality, it is hard to speculate, however, 
there is no question that the CPI (M) will want to learn from the mistakes of the previous 
Maoist movements (especially in India) in order to successfully maintain legitimacy in 
the areas already under its control as well as spread its influence into new districts and 
states.   
Coordination within the military does not appear as strong in comparison to the 
CPN (M) or the Shining Path, particularly since the types of actions carried out differ, in 
some instances, remarkably, by state (where, in some instances, the Maoist militias are 
more interested in self-preservation, where in others, the goal is to provoke the Indian 
military forces).  Also, because there is a disconnect existing between the stated goals of 
the party leaders in regards to the development of base areas and what is actually being 
implemented (social justice with little or no development), this may also suggest a 
breakdown in coordination.  However, the party has been able to expand its influence and 
authority since 2004, but not to the extent witnessed in Nepal, and it has not 
demonstrated the same ability to bridge gaps between class, ethnicity and caste.204  
Therefore, at the present moment, the CPI (M) has been “successful”. 
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Conclusions 
 
All talk to the effect that historical conditions have not yet 
"ripened" for socialism is the product of ignorance or 
conscious deception. The objective prerequisites for the 
proletarian revolution have not only "ripened"; they have 
begun to get somewhat rotten. Without a socialist revolution, 
in the next historical period at that, a catastrophe threatens the 
whole culture of mankind. The turn is now to the proletariat, 
i.e., chiefly to its revolutionary vanguard. The historical crisis 
of mankind is reduced to the crisis of the revolutionary 
leadership.                                                                                  
–Leon Trotsky 
 
You cannot carry out fundamental change without a certain 
degree of madness... It took the madmen of yesterday for us to 
be able to act with extreme clarity today.                                                                                
–Thomas Sankara 
 
Operating primarily in the heavily forested states of India and half hidden from 
much of the Indian public, nearly 10,000 Maoists, under the leadership of the CPI (M), 
are fighting over stretches of mineral-laden land the size of Portugal known as the Red 
Corridor.  From areas like the Dandakaranya Regional Zone where the rebels operate 
their own schools and rudimentary clinics, print their own books, and fly a red flag, they 
carry out attacks which threaten, according to the Indian government, at least $78 billion 
in natural resource and mining projects.205  India’s quest to catch up with China and the 
United States in terms of industrialization depends upon unlocking the supposed treasure 
chest of resources existing beneath the Maoist-held territory.  The Maoists in charge of 
these areas feel that the state was exploiting the people of the area by stealing the mineral 
wealth while ignoring rampant underdevelopment.  This sentiment can hardly be 
attributed simply to the group’s hardline, anti-government stance; rather it is imbued 
within India’s concrete reality.  When over 80 percent of Indians live on less than 50¢ per 
day, when thousands of debt-ridden farmers are killing themselves, and when child 
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malnutrition figures are equivalent to most countries in sub-Saharan Africa206 207, India, 
in reality, is hardly the idyllic picture found in an R.K Narayan novel or the 
overwhelming capitalist success upheld in the media.  In fact, Arundhati Roy summed up 
the situation aptly when she wrote, “If the motion picture were an art form that involved 
the olfactory senses, in other words if cinema smelled, then films like ‘Slumdog 
Millionaire’ would not win Oscars. The stench of that kind of poverty wouldn’t blend 
with the aroma of warm popcorn.”208  It is not hard to understand the support shown by 
millions of poor throughout India for the CPI (M)’s establishment of people’s courts and 
mass organizations which drive out exploiting corporations, landlords, and political 
representatives who uphold the status quo.209  Lalu Yandev, a famous Indian politician 
from Bihar, famously quipped, “I’ve not given them (the poor people of Bihar) heaven, 
but I've given them a voice.”210 The cadre of the CPI (M), living throughout the Red 
Corridor, could certainly proffer a similar claim.  And because of the efforts of the CPI 
(M) to stand up for, and integrate the poorest and most marginalized sectors of Indian 
society into its movement, it has, from 2004 onwards, achieved success, both in 
incorporating women into the party ranks, as well as in establishing and expanding bases 
of influence. Most surprisingly, perhaps, is that this work was achieved with a largely 
decentralized party structure. 
In Nepal, the CPN (M), over a span of ten years, carried out the world’s most 
successful Maoist insurgency (not including, of course, the Chinese Revolution, although 
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Mao probably would not refer to himself or his fighters as Maoist, just as Marx famously 
quipped, “I’m not a Marxist”).211 212  With a centralized party structure, it expanded its 
authority from three or four regions in 1996 to nearly all 75.  Coordination existed to a 
large degree, as the CPN (M) effectively concatenated base areas through unified military 
actions.  The Maoist military also needed to be able to respond once the Nepalese 
government initiated a countrywide counterinsurgency campaign, and instead of focusing 
solely on self-preservation, the Maoists pressed forward, directly challenging the Royal 
Nepal Army, and in many cases, handing them decisive defeats.  Because of strong 
coordination between the upper level of the party hierarchy (and Prachanda in particular) 
and the regional militias, the Maoists had the Nepalese government on the ropes in 2006.  
The Nepalese Maoists also appeared to be more successful than the Shining Path in the 
maintenance of relations among the masses, illustrated by a stronger emphasis on 
developing beneficial programs for the population in the base areas, such as schools and 
health clinics.  The Shining Path, in some of the territory under its control, was able to 
achieve similar results, but it alienated its base with its adulation of revolutionary 
violence.  Both parties seemed to demonstrate an analogous approach to gender 
inequality, and in both Peru and Nepal, women achieved a visibility and influence in the 
Maoist parties that could not be boasted by any of the “legal” political parties.   
The CPN (M) is a great example of a centralized party operating efficaciously and 
achieving success.  The Shining Path was not as successful, and may have even benefited 
from a different party structure.  Had Guzmán’s leadership been more decentralized and 
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less hierarchical, his capture in 1992 may have been less consequential.213  Even though 
many of the social and economic problems that initially fueled the movement still 
remain,214 state repression in response to a guerrilla insurgency may undermine the 
vibrancy possessed by that type of movement.215  The state’s overall response, along with 
the Shining Path’s violent tendencies, both played a significant role in limiting the 
amount of territory that the Shining Path could capture.  Both the CPN (M) and the 
Shining Path had well-organized military forces, but the former proved more adroit at 
utilizing its military capabilities.  The CPI (M) cannot, at this moment, be judged as 
rigorously as the previous two groups, primarily due to its shorter existence.  Also, since 
it is still active, it is hard to fully understand its exact achievements and failures.  It has 
certainly achieved a great success up to this point in the empowerment and mobilization 
of women, especially within its military.  Also, because the group appeals to poor tribal 
communities, it has been able to spread significantly throughout India since 2004.  Both 
of these successes have come despite the CPI (M) being a largely decentralized 
organization.  Therefore, it cannot be stated definitively that a centralized party 
necessarily is more capable of achieving its stated goals.   
Today, in a somewhat ironic twist of fate, Guzmán shares a prison in Callao with 
two of his former government pursuers, Alberto Fujimori and the former head of Peru’s 
intelligence agency, Vladimiro Montesinos, and he has largely distanced himself from 
today’s incarnation of the Shining Path.  In Nepal, the Maoists (under the new name 
“Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)”) have been caught up in internecine 
fighting, with leader Prachanda accused of, “revisionism, eclecticism, reformism and 
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dishonesty” by members of his own party.216 In both cases, the centralized party seemed 
to break down, and in the case of Nepal, a power struggle appears eminent.  The Nepali 
Maoists were quite successful in leading a people’s war with a centralized, vanguard 
party.  Yet, by the same criterion, the Indian Maoists have also been successful with a 
decentralized form of authority. Therefore, my hypothesis is incorrect, evidenced by the 
spread of the CPI (M) in India and its conspicuous role in recruiting and training women.  
The Indian Maoists, therefore, are a new threat in that they can achieve similar results as 
a centralized party without having one, distinct head.  Thus, the group has had a 
somewhat easier time in rebounding after the death or capture of a key member.  Despite 
problems of coercive compliance and member motivation, decentralization seems to be 
the more desirable authority structure within social movements, and it appears that the 
Indian Maoists are following this path, and with early success.217 218 These findings are 
my contribution to the discourse of leadership and the party in Marxism, and although the 
example of the CPI (M) is not enough to completely shatter or negate the idea of the 
“vanguard party”, it is a relevant example of a group leading a revolution in a 
decentralized manner. 
This is obviously quite a laconic and somewhat accelerated look at three different 
Maoist rebel groups, their party structure, and how that structure may have helped them 
accrue “success” in combating gender equality and gaining bases of influence.  While 
theoretically, there may a link between gender equality and the ability to spread into new 
territory, I am not directly addressing that in this paper.  In the future, it might be useful 
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to do a more extensive analysis of the base areas of each group in order to see if there 
was any progress made in combating illiteracy, malnutrition, the spread of disease, etc.  If 
the CPI (M) is truly India’s “largest internal threat”, it would be interesting to see if they 
are offering a true alternative to the Indian government, or if it is simply a new form of 
oppression. In many of the areas under their control, the CPI (M) seems to be more 
concerned with administering popular justice, and have either been a hindrance to, or 
neglected development.219  Development indicators for the areas under rebel control 
could either reinforce or discredit the desirability of each of movements, based upon their 
performances.  The performances would also suggest the strength of coordination (i.e. a 
rise in the literacy rate would suggest coordination if the party stated that it wanted to 
erase illiteracy).  Another appealing topic for future examination would be each party’s 
approach to differences in class, ethnicity, and (where it exists) caste.  In the interview I 
conducted with Ranjan Kamath, he indicated that the Indian Maoists oftentimes are 
associated with a particular caste and have a difficult time discerning the class-caste 
overlap.220  Overall, the CPI (M) has not yet attained the successes of the Nepalese 
Maoists, but if the government of India continues to pursue a policy of counterinsurgency 
rather than one of development, the insurgency will exist for quite some time as an 
alternative.  Today, one of the major hurdles for the Indian Maoists is the overlap of caste 
and class and how that affects its support base.  This may be a problem that can never be 
fully assuaged, yet the Indian Maoists seem continually engaged within the complexities 
and contradictions which exist in modern India.  The French author Anatole France once 
wrote, “It is by acts and not by ideas that people live.”  The three Maoist groups would 
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claim that they are acting upon certain ideas, yet, because the vast amount of people 
living in Maoist base areas in India do not know who Marx or Lenin were, it is action that 
sustains the masses and defines the capabilities of the leadership, centralized or 
otherwise. 
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